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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The caption of this case identifies all parties to this proceeding. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal pursuant to section 78-
2a-2(b)(i) of the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Is the decision of the Utah County Career Service Council (the "Council"), 
finding that appellants' grievance was timely filed, properly reviewed for clear error, 
granting considerable deference to the Council's resolution of a disputed issue of fact? 
Which standard of review applies is a question of law, reviewed by this Court for 
correctness. See Lvsenko v. Sawava. 2000 UT 58, Tf 15, 7 P.3d 783 (Utah 2000). 
2. Was the Council's determination that the Deputies' grievance was timely 
filed arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable? 
Because the trial court reviewed the Council's record in an appellate function, and 
because this is an appeal from an order granting the County's motion under Rule 65B, 
this Court reviews the Council's decision directly and affords no deference to the trial 
court's ruling. See Wells, 936 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Tolman v. Salt 
Lake County. 818 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4(l)(d)(iv) and Rule 65B(d)(4) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Council's timeliness decision is presumptively valid and 
cannot be overturned unless it constitutes "a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion." See 
State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 923 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Indian Village Trading Post, 
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1 
Inc. v. Bench, 929 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Renn v. Utah State Bd. of 
Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4-(l)(d)(iv) ("In reviewing a decision of the career 
service council, the district court shall presume that the decision is valid and may 
determine only whether the decision is arbitrary or capricious."). 
Rule 65B(d)(4) ("Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the 
court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether the respondent has 
regularly pursued its authority."). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Honorable Fred D. Howard, granting Utah County's Petition for Extraordinary Relief, 
filed pursuant to Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and reversing the 
decision of the Utah County Career Service Council (the "Council") in favor of 
Appellants George S. Alexanderson and Charles Martin (the "Deputies"). 
The Deputies are employed by the Utah County Sheriffs Department.1 Deputy 
Charles Martin was hired by the Department on January 13, 1986. On June 24, 1987, he 
was promoted to the rank of Shift Supervisor, a first-line supervisor position, within the 
Jail Division of the Department. (R. 381) Deputy George Alexanderson was hired by the 
Department on February 8, 1988. On April 30, 1990, he was promoted 1o the rank of 
1
 After the Utah County Career Service Council issued its decision in favor of the 
Deputies, and while this matter was pending before the trial court, Deputy Martin retired. 
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Shift Supervisor, a first-line supervisor position within the Jail Division of the 
Department. (R. 330) The position of Shift Supervisor was, at all relevant times, a 
ranked, first-line supervisor position within the Department generally, including the Jail 
Division. The Department authorized all officers who held the rank of Shift Supervisor 
to wear evidence and insignia of that rank—corporal stripes—on their Department 
uniforms, and officers who held this rank regularly did so. (R. 330) 
In 1991, the County conducted a "reclassification study" which included an 
analysis of the positions within the Department, including the jail division. As a result of 
that study, and based upon recommendations made by the Department, the rank of Shift 
Supervisor within the Department was eliminated, or "reclassified," as a Sergeant 
position and rank, with higher pay. (R. 330) The job duties and responsibilities carried 
out by Shift Supervisors, prior to the elimination of that rank, were materially identical to 
the job duties and responsibilities carried out by Sergeants at that time. Indeed, this was 
one purpose of the reclassification: To make the rank structure consistent with the duties 
and responsibilities carried out by particular officers. (R. 330) As Shift Supervisors 
serving within the Jail Division of the Department, the Deputies reasonably understood 
and believed, based upon assurances and representations made to them by Department 
management and Shift Supervisor meetings and in other settings, and on the fact that it 
was not expected that the duties of the position would be changed in any material way, 
that they would be promoted to the rank and position of Sergeant as a result of the 
reclassification. (R. 379) Due to budgetary constraints, staffing needs, and other factors, 
While his retirement resolved certain issues related to retroactive advancement in rank, it 
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the Department decided not to promote all those previously serving as Shift Supervisors 
within the Jail Division of the Department to the rank of Sergeant, but to instead open 
four newly created Sergeant positions to interested applicants. (R. 379) 
After the reclassification, but before the newly created Sergeant positions were 
filled, the Deputies, and others serving as Shift Supervisors, were demoted from the rank 
of Shift Supervisor to the position of Corrections Specialist. Then the rate of pay for a 
Corrections Specialist was increased to match that previously paid to Shift Supervisors, 
thereby eliminating the pay differential that the deputies had previously enjoyed. Despite 
this demotion, the Deputies were instructed to perform substantially the same duties they 
had previously been performing as Shift Supervisors, and also to continue to wear the 
evidence and insignia of the rank of Shift Supervisor. (R. 379). The Deputies did as they 
were ordered. (R. 379) The Deputies, together with other interested applicants, 
including others previously serving as Shift Supervisors within the Jail Division of the 
Department, expressed their desire to be considered for the four newly created Sergeant 
positions by submitting a letter of interest and resume, as requested by the Department. 
(R. 378) 
At the time the Department was considering these expressions of interest in the 
four newly-created Sergeant positions, it had established and had in effect certain job-
related minimum qualifications for the position. These included, among other things, 
"current POST Certification, and current CPR Certification [and] requires B.S. Degree, 
including 30 semester hours in psychology, sociology, interpersonal relations, or closely 
did not resolve his entitlement to back pay, as ordered by the Council. 
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related fields." (R. 378) At this time, the Department also had established and had in 
effect certain advancement policies which, by their terms, were to remain in effect until 
rescinded or revised. For the Jail Division, these policies included a requirement that all 
those seeking promotion "will be subject to" written examination, oral interview, and the 
review of evaluations and length of service. (R. 378) In addition, those policies provided 
that promotion to the rank of Sergeant within the jail division required "[t]hree (3) years 
of Correctional Experience, including one (1) year as a Shift Supervisor." (R. 378) 
The policies referred to above were in effect at all relevant times, and remained in 
effect until after the conclusion of the proceedings before the Council. In fact, apparently 
in response to the Deputies arguments before the Council, Sheriff Bateman issued a 
memorandum dated November 26, 1997, formally rescinding the policies "effective 
immediately." (R. 377) At the time the Department filled the four newly-created 
Sergeant positions, the Deputies each possessed the required qualifications for the newly-
created positions and otherwise met all established advancement policies. Neither 
Deputy had disciplinary records within the Department, and each had previously been 
commended for their work as Shift Supervisors. Neither Deputy was promoted into one 
of the newly-created Sergeant positions. (R. 377) 
When the Department filled the newly-created Sergeant positions, the Department 
failed to hold a written examination, failed to conduct oral interviews, and failed to 
consider the length of service, including correctional experience and experience as a Shift 
Supervisor, all in violation of established policy. (R. 377) In addition, as the Deputies 
later discovered, when the Department filled the newly-created Sergeant positions, three 
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of the four individuals it promoted did not meet the established minimum qualifications 
for the position, or otherwise failed to meet established advancement policies. (R. 376) 
The Department, in violation of its policies, promoted individuals who were not POST-
certified, or who did not hold a college degree, or who did not have corrections 
experience, or experience as a Shift Supervisor. (R. 376) Two individuals who formerly 
held the rank of Shift Supervisor in the Jail Division were promoted to the newly-created 
Sergeant positions. Neither of those individuals held "current POST Certification" at the 
time they were promoted, and therefore did not possess the minimum qualifications 
necessary to hold the rank of Sergeant. (R. 376) The third sergeant position was filled 
by Dennis Howard, an individual from outside the Jail Division who did not possess the 
minimum qualifications to hold the rank of Sergeant in the Jail Division, because he did 
not possess a college degree and had never attained the rank of Shift Supervisor, as 
required by Department policy. (R. 376) 
Four individuals who held the rank of Shift Supervisor in the Jail Division were 
not promoted to Sergeant in the 1991 "reclassification." These included Deputy Martin, 
Deputy Alexanderson, Deputy Rod Robinson, and Deputy John Gruenbaum. (R. 376) 
At or about the time of these promotions, Deputy Rod Robinson was "demoted" for cause 
arising out of an internal affairs investigation. (R. 376) In a disciplinary letter from 
Sheriff Bateman to Deputy Robinson, Sheriff Bateman characterized Deputy Robinson's 
discipline as follows: "The issue of disciplinary action shall be disposed as follows: 1, 
2
 The fourth and final Sergeant position was filled by an Administrative Sergeant within 
the Jail Division of the Department. (R. 376) While his appointment to that position was 
222027.8 
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reduction of rank to Corrections Specialist. This issue has become moot as a result of the 
reclassification of the Shift Supervisor position." (R. 375) In other words, Deputy 
Robinson was demoted for cause to the rank of Corrections Specialist. Deputies Martin 
and Alexanderson, along with Deputy Gruenbaum, were also demoted, without cause, to 
that same rank. (R. 375) After the Deputies were passed over for promotion to the rank 
of Sergeant, they were instructed to and did remove the evidence and insignia of their 
prior rank from their department uniforms, and those who were promoted to the rank of 
Sergeant were instructed and did wear the evidence and insignia of their new rank. (R. 
375) The new Sergeants also received a corresponding pay increase. (R. 375) 
After the reclassification, the responsibilities and duties of Sergeants within the 
Jail Division of the Department were intended to be and were in fact substantially similar 
to the responsibilities and duties previously performed by Shift Supervisors within the 
Jail Division of the Department. (R. 375) After Deputy Alexanderson was passed over 
for promotion, and as a result of the humiliation and frustration he felt at being demoted 
to the same grade and pay level within the Jail Division he had previously supervised, he 
requested and received a transfer to the Patrol Division of the Department, and later to the 
Warrants Division, where he currently serves as a Deputy-in-Charge. (R. 374) 
After Deputy Martin was passed over for a promotion to the rank of Sergeant, he 
was on the same grade and pay level as those in the Jail Division he had previously 
supervised. (R. 374) Deputy Martin was ordered to and did train those promoted over 
him to the rank of Sergeant. (R. 374) Deputy Martin trained these individuals because 
not in violation of policy, it also was not a promotion because he already held the rank of 
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their duties were substantially the same as the duties he had capably performed for more 
than four years. (R. 374) As a result of the humiliation and frustration Deputy Martin 
felt at being demoted to the same grade and pay level as those within the Jail Division he 
had previously supervised, he requested and received a transfer to the Animal Control 
Division of the Department in June of 1992, where he served as Deputy-in-Charge. (R. 
374) On December 7, 1998, after the proceedings before the Council, and while this 
matter had been pending on appeal to the trial court, Deputy Martin retired from the 
Department. (R. 374) 
After the Deputies were demoted, they informally complained to their superiors 
about not having been promoted. (R. 374) The Deputies were repeatedly assured by 
members of the administration, including the Sheriff, that their concerns would be 
addressed internally, that they were eligible to and should continue to pairticipate in the 
promotion process, and that they ultimately would be promoted to the rank of Sergeant. 
(R. 374) The Deputies relied upon these assurances and continued their efforts to 
informally resolve their grievance within the Department, and obtain promotions through 
ongoing participation in the various offered promotional processes. (R. 373-74) Both 
Deputies, in the time period after their demotions but before the filing of their grievance 
based upon merit principles, in good faith and on numerous occasions, continued to 
participate in the wide variety of "testing" or "evaluation" procedures employed by the 
Department, and otherwise expressed their continued interest in being considered for 
advancement to the rank of Sergeant. In each case, however, they were passed over for 
Sergeant. (R. 376) 
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promotion. (R. 373) The Deputies later learned that the Department, on numerous 
occasions beginning in at least December 1991, promoted individuals who did not meet 
the established job-related minimum qualifications and were not, under the Department's 
own policies, eligible for promotion. (R. 373) During this time, the Department also 
failed to conduct appropriate testing, failed to establish correct eligibility lists or 
appointment registers, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-7, and failed to make 
eligibility lists and appointment registers available for inspection by applicants. (R. 374) 
In addition, the Deputies were repeatedly assured by Department management that 
they would be treated fairly as a result of the "reclassification" culminating in the 
Sheriffs final assurance in 1996, when he promised to investigate and "make it right." 
(R. 370) The deputies were urged by Department management to continue to apply for 
promotions within the Department, which they did for some time. However, the 
promotion and eligibility requirements fluctuated widely, and were often disregarded by 
the Department and the County Personnel Office. (R. 370) 
On December 9, 1996, the Deputies learned about an incident involving attempted 
manipulation of department testing. At that time, Sergeant Mike Morgan told the 
Deputies that he had been contacted by a Lieutenant in the Department. (R. 369) The 
Lieutenant asked him to write down questions that would appear on the test, and 
consulted with him about those questions. (R. 369) The Lieutenant then asked about a 
particular candidate that Sergeant Morgan was supervising, a candidate who the 
Lieutenant thought should get the promotion that was involved in the testing. (R. 369) 
The Lieutenant said to Sergeant Morgan, "Well, I guess if you left these questions on 
222027.8 
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your desk and somebody walked in and happened to see them when you weren't in there, 
you couldn't be held responsible for that." (R. 369) Sergeant Morgan, to his credit, 
refused to participate in what was clearly unlawful conduct, and shredded the questions. 
(R. 369) 
Eight days later, on December 17, 1996, the Deputies, in direct response to their 
December 9 discovery of the Department's illegal actions, met with Sheriff Bateman to 
discuss their concerns regarding promotions and the evidence of corruption within the 
Department. (R. 369) The Deputies asked Sheriff Bateman to investigate and remedy 
the situation. (R. 369) On December 30, 1996, Sheriff Bateman sent a letter to Deputy 
Martin responding to some of the issues raised in the December 17 meeting. (R. 341, 
369) In that letter, Sheriff Bateman stated for the first time that "[t]he 
issue of automatic advancement of Shift Supervisors is not warranted because the 
position of'"Shift Supervisor'" was never a ranked position . . . " (R. 341, 368) This was 
the first time that the Sheriff had contended that Shift Supervisor was not a ranked 
position, and the first time he had articulated that this was the reason why the Deputies 
were not given automatic advancement to the rank of Sergeant after their ranked position 
was eliminated. (R. 368) In this letter, Sheriff Bateman also conceded for the very first 
time, that there had been "inconsistencies" in the Department's promotional processes. 
(R. 340, 368) 
In December 1996, the Deputies discovered serious irregularities, dating back 
several years, in the processes utilized by the Utah County Sheriff (the "Sheriff) to make 
career service promotions within the Department. The Deputies also discovered that 
222027.8 
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some of these irregularities had resulted in their being passed over for promotion to the 
rank of Sergeant. Specifically, the Deputies learned for the first time that the Sheriff had 
been operating for all relevant years on the erroneous assumption that the Shift 
Supervisor rank held by the Deputies in 1991 was "not a ranked position in the 
Department." In the December 1996 meeting, the Sheriff cited this erroneous assumption 
as the basis for having denied the Deputies5 promotions in 1991. In later proceedings 
before the Council, the Sheriff was forced to abandon this position, and ultimately 
testified that it was "patently obvious to anybody" that shift supervisor was, in fact, a 
ranked position. 
Armed with their recently-acquired knowledge that the Department's failure to 
promote them was based on faulty premises, and that promotions generally may have 
been flawed, on January 10, 1997, the Deputies filed a grievance with the Utah County 
Career Service Council4 (the "Council") challenging the promotion procedures employed 
During his testimony before the Council, Sheriff Bateman acknowledged that, in fact, 
Shift Supervisor was a ranked position. Sheriff Bateman testified as follows: 
Q: Is it your testimony, then, that the Shift Supervisor 
position is a ranked position, or was considered a ranked 
position? 
A: It was considered a ranked position, but in a limited 
context. It was a ranked position of the jail, and it was a 
ranked position in the Civil Division, but that's all. 
Q: It was a ranked position? 
A: I think that's patently obvious to anybody. 
(R. 368) 
The Council is "a three-member appeals and personnel advisory board" that, by statute, 
must be comprised of "persons in sympathy with the application of merit principles to 
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by the Sheriff and the Sheriffs continued failure to promote them to the rank of Sergeant. 
The Council heard argument and evidence on March 27, 1997, April 23, 1997, and May 
29, 1997. The Deputies presented evidence that between 1991 and 1996 they had tried, at 
the Department's urging, to resolve these issues internally, that they had been repeatedly 
assured that promotions were forthcoming, and that they continued to participate in good 
faith in Sergeant's testing on the basis of these assurances. The Council also heard 
evidence that the Department had for years concealed basic evidence that it was required 
by policy and law to make available, and which ultimately supported the Deputies' 
claims. The County's principal argument before the Council, and its principal argument 
before the trial court, was that the Deputies had failed to file their grievamce within the 
three-month time limit established by the Council's own rules. 
On the basis of the evidence presented, the Council issued a written decision in 
favor of the Deputies (the Council's "first decision") on June 30, 1997. (R. 349) 
Specifically, the Council "reconfirm[ed]" that the Deputies' case should not be time 
barred and determined that the Deputies' "discussion with Sheriff Bateman in December, 
1996 was the date that should drive the time for filing." Because the Deputies filed 
public employment." Utah Code Ann. §17-33-2(2); id § 17-33-4(l)(a). Section VII E.l 
of the Utah County Office of Personnel Management Rules and Regulation States in 
relevant part: 
Any career service employee who has completed a Schedule 
B probationary period or a promotional trial period having a 
grievance over merit principles may appeal to the Career 
Service Council. The employee must file a written notice 
with the personnel director within three months from the date 
of the occurrence. 
(R. 247) 
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within three months of that date, their claim was not barred. (R. 348) Regarding the 
merits, the Council determined that "promotions have been based on arbitrary criteria. 
The current testing procedures appear inconsistent, biased and capricious. Evidence 
supported the fact that some employees were promoted to the Sergeant's rank that did not 
meet the qualifications outlined in the various policies." (R. 349) As a result, the 
Council recommended "that the county implement standardized and unbiased testing 
procedures. All policies regarding promotional testing should be updated, consistent with 
each other, clearly communicated to all applicable employees, and carefully followed." 
(R. 349) By way of remedy, the Council recommended (1) that the Deputies be 
promoted to the rank of Sergeant, effective immediately, and (2) that the Deputies be paid 
at the Sergeant's level retroactive to December 9, 1991, taking into account cost of living 
adjustments but not including merit increases "and other possible related benefits 
commensurate with the rank of Sergeant." (R. 349) 
On July 15, 1997, the County filed its petition with the trial court, pursuant to Rule 
65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 245-329) The Deputies responded with a 
motion to dismiss. (R. 46) The trial court denied the Deputies' motion in an October 22, 
1997 order, and also remanded the case to the Council "for the entry of findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in connection with its decision of June 30, 1997." (R. 119) The 
trial court noted that pending this remand for the entry of findings, the trial court would 
"retain jurisdiction over this matter pending the entry of such findings of fact and 
conclusions of law by the Council." (R. 119) The trial court's remand order specifically 
stated that the Council could "[m]ake such changes, additions, or modifications to its 
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decision as it may deem necessary or desirable . . . and [d]o other such things . . . as it 
may deem necessary or desirable to clarify or enhance the record of the proceedings for 
eventual review" by the trial court, but did not authorize the Council to vacate or 
otherwise reverse the decision. (R. 119 (emphasis added)) The trial court anticipated 
that once the Council made findings and conclusions, it would "then perform its review . . 
. in accordance with applicable law and as requested by Utah County in its petition for 
extraordinary relief." (R. 118) 
Following the trial court's remand order, the Council did nothing for more than 
two years. The task of preparing findings and conclusions initially was assigned to Ryan 
Robert Beuhring a Council member who had participated in the decision. In a highly 
unusual move, the County Personnel Director had an ex parte communication with Mr. 
Beuhring about the decision and the fact that the County could not enforce nor afford to 
pay for the result of the June 30 decision.5 The County could have permitted Mr. 
5
 On September 8, 2000, Mr. Beuhring filed an affidavit with the trial court. (R. 239-242) 
In his affidavit, he stated that when the trial court remanded the case to the Council, his 
"term on the Council [was] [about to] expire. However, it would not have been unusual 
for the Affiant to continue to serve to finish cases under consideration." (R. 241) 
Beuhring further stated that during his "final month on the Council" the Personnel 
Director of Utah County had an ex parte discussion with Beuhring concerning the 
Deputies' grievance. During their discussion, the Personnel Director made the comment 
to Beuhring that Utah County could not enforce nor afford to pay for the result of the 
June 30, 1997 decision. Beuhring reaffirmed that he sustained and would uphold the 
decision of the Council regarding the result of the Deputies' grievance. The Personnel 
Director then commented to Beuhring that he could be replaced on the Council because 
his term was expiring. In fact, his term on the Council did expire, and he was not 
permitted to finish the Deputies' case. At the time he was working on the case, the 
Council as a whole believed that the findings and conclusions submitted by the Deputies' 
counsel "were fairly representative of the views held by the Council." "On the other 
hand, the Council of a whole did not believe that the majority of the County's proposed 
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Beuhring to complete the findings and conclusions. It chose not to do so, however, and 
an entirely new Council, none of whom had participated in the decision, was left the task 
of preparing findings and conclusions. More than two years later, on November 29, 
1999, the Council issued a written decision (the "second decision") in which it declined 
to enter findings of fact and instead claimed, erroneously, that the trial court should 
review the matter de novo under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16. (R. 146) The Council also determined that its June 30, 1997 
determination was a "'final decision' in this matter as contemplated by [Utah Code Ann. 
§] 63-46b-5(i)." (R. 146) The Deputies pointed out to the Council that the matter was 
not subject to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, and then the case languished for 
several more months. 
On April 10, 2000, the trial court entered an order to show cause why the Council 
should not be held in contempt. (R. 157-58). In response, the Council issued another 
decision (the "third decision") which purported to vacate the original, June 1997 decision, 
in violation of the trial court's remand order. (R. 1133-37) In this third decision, the 
Council did not squarely address the Council's first determination that the three-month 
rule began to run upon the Deputies' December, 1996 meeting with Sheriff 
Bateman. Instead, the Council noted cursorily that the Deputies' January 10, 1997 
"grievance was not timely and is dismissed. Any prior contrary finding or conclusion of 
the previous Council is vacated." (R. 1134) 
findings and conclusions were consistent with the evidence and testimony given, and, in 
fact, seemed counter intuitive to the findings of the Council." (R. 240-41) 
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The Deputies objected to the Council's third decision, (R. 164-77), and the matter 
was briefed and argued by both parties. On September 12, 2000 the trial court issued a 
minute entry stating, in pertinent part, that the Council's "first decision was final, District 
Court retained jurisdiction and findings must be consistent with the first decision of the 
[Council]." (R. 243) Thus, at this point, the Council's first decision was reaffirmed by 
the trial court and remained the final order of the Council. 
At Utah County's request, the court allowed additional briefing on the timeliness 
of the Deputies' filing. While Utah County's petition was being briefed, the court 
entered its order regarding the Council's third decision. (R. 396-99) In its Order 
Sustaining Objections, the trial court stated that 
After having reviewed the file including the memoranda of 
the parties, after having heard the oral arguments of the 
parties, and after having been fully informed in the premises, 
the Court finds and concludes that the [Council] failed to 
follow the Court's Order dated October 27, 1997, and 
exceeded the Council's jurisdiction by entering it's [sic] April 
27, 2000 Ruling, that the Court by it's [sic] October 27, 1997 
Order had retained jurisdiction over the matter and the 
purpose of the Court's Order was for the entry of findings of 
fact and conclusions of law consistent with the Council's 
Ruling of June 30, 1997, that the Council's April 27, 2000 
Ruling was inconsistent with it's [sic] June 30, 1997 Ruling, 
that the Court should disregard the Council's April 27, 2000 
Ruling, that the Court should proceed and decide the issues 
raised by the Petitioner's Petition For Extraordinary Relief in 
light of the Council's actions without the benefit of findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, and that the Respondents' 
objections to the April 27, 2000 Ruling of the Utah County 
Career Service Council should be sustained. 
(R. 398-99 (emphasis added)) 
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After oral argument on Utah County's petition for extraordinary relief, on 
September 27, 2001, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision upholding the 
Council's determination that the "testing procedures were at best inconsistent, and very 
likely involved subjective criteria to the point of being arbitrary and violative of merit 
principles." (R. 1453-60) The trial court, however, abruptly reversed the Council's 
determination that the Deputies' grievance was timely. In doing so, the trial court 
reviewed the timeliness decision as a matter of law and gave no deference to the 
Council's determination. (R. 1456) Based on its conclusion that the Deputies' grievance 
was untimely as a matter of law, the trial court entered an Order Granting Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief on January 2, 2002. (R. 1461-62) This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah County Sheriffs Office was engaged in widespread, systematic 
violations of the merit principles it was legally obligated to apply in making promotion 
decisions. Because of these irregularities, the Deputies were not advanced to the rank of 
Sergeant as they otherwise should have been. Instead, the Deputies were placed in the 
untenable position of being supervised by former subordinates who had been improperly 
promoted to the rank of Sergeant instead of the Deputies. The Council and the trial court 
repeatedly upheld the Council's initial determination that the County's promotion 
procedures violated merit principles. Importantly, the County has not appealed this 
determination. 
The trial court also initially resisted attacks on the Council's determination that the 
Deputies' grievance had been timely filed. When the Council made this determination, it 
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found that the three-month rule began to run in December 1996, when the Deputies met 
with Sheriff Bateman and learned for the first time that the promotion and eligibility 
requirements fluctuated widely and were often disregarded by Department management, 
and that the Deputies had been denied promotion based on the erroneous position that 
Shift Supervisor was not a ranked position. However, in a January 2002 order, the trial 
court abruptly reversed field and concluded, as a matter of law, that the Deputies' 
grievance was untimely. 
This Court reviews the Council's decision directly, rather than reviewing the 
decision of the trial court. Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). It therefore gives deference to the trial court's reversal of the Council's 
timeliness ruling. IdL The Council's factual determination that the Deputies did not learn 
of their cause of action until December 1996 should be afforded great deference because 
the Council sat in a privileged position as fact finder. In addition, even to the extent 
questions of law are involved, a reviewing court must give an extra measure of deference 
to the Council. Because the record supports the Council's first decision and the trial 
court's reversal was erroneous, the Council's June 30, 1997 decision should be affirmed 
and the trial court's January 2, 2002 Order Granting Petition for Extraordinary Relief 
should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
In its June 30, 1997 ruling, the Council specifically found (1) that the Deputies' 
grievance was timely filed; (2) that the Deputies had been improperly passed over for 
promotion to the rank of Sergeant; and (3) that department promotions in general "have 
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been based on arbitrary criteria . . . " and "current testing procedures appear inconsistent, 
biased, and capricious." The Council ordered immediate promotion of the Deputies to 
the rank of Sergeant and back pay to December 9, 1991, the date on which they were first 
improperly passed over for promotion. The Council also recommended that the County 
implement standardized and unbiased testing procedures and that policies regarding 
promotional testing be updated, consistent with each other, clearly communicated to 
applicable employees, and carefully followed. 
The County's main challenge below was to the Council's finding that the Deputies 
had timely filed. The County argued that the Deputies failed to comply with the three-
month rule set forth in the Council's own rules. Importantly, the three month rule is not 
based on a statute, but rather is found only in the County's own personnel rules. 
The Council took up the issue of timeliness on three separate occasions and, each 
time, took evidence and heard arguments of counsel on the subject. On each occasion, 
the Council unanimously rejected the County's timeliness argument and held that the 
Deputies' grievance was timely filed. The Council's finding that the petition was timely 
filed was based on its conclusion that the Deputies' meeting with the Sheriff in December 
1996 was the triggering event for purposes of applying the three-month rule. The 
Council's decision to reach back to the time of the 1991 promotional decision at issue 
was justified by the Department's repeated assurances of promotion to the Deputies, by 
their discovery in December 1996 of the erroneous basis upon which they had been 
denied promotions, and by the Council's careful examination of each promotional 
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process from 1991 to 1996, an examination that revealed widespread irregularities and 
showed that the Department had concealed basic facts relating to the promotion process. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's January 2, 2002 ruling for two reasons. 
First, the trial court should have applied a highly deferential standard of review to the 
Council's multiple fact determinations that the Deputies' grievance was timely filed. 
Because the question of whether the Deputies knew or should have known the facts 
forming their cause of action on a certain date is a classic question of fact, the Council's 
determination in this regard should only be reversed if the record does not support the 
determination, "resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
[Council's] determination." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
Second, even if the Council's determination is reviewed as a question of law—a 
standard incorrectly applied by the trial court—the Council's determinalion that the 
grievance was timely filed should still be affirmed. Under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the reviewing court (whether trial court or appellate court) grants an 
extra measure of deference to the lower tribunal's ruling, even when the decision 
involves an issue of law. Thus, the trial court should have reversed the Council's 
determination only if the determination was a gross and flagrant abuse of the Council's 
discretion. Because the record supports the Council's timeliness determination—and in 
fact was reaffirmed numerous times by the Council—the trial court's January 2, 2002 
ruling should be reversed and the Council's June 30, 1997 ruling allowed to stand. 
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1. The trial court incorrectly reviewed the council's timeliness 
determination as a pure question of law rather than a mixed question 
of fact and law. 
The County's challenge below was premised on its assertion that the Council's 
timeliness determination should be reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to 
the Council's privileged position as a finder of fact. The trial court, perhaps 
unaccustomed to sitting in an appellate capacity, adopted this position and reviewed the 
Council's timeliness determination as a matter of law. This approach was erroneous. 
Importantly, there is no statute setting forth the three-month rule; it is instead purely an 
internal rule. The Council determined that the Deputies' grievance was timely because 
the Deputies did not know, or have reason to know, of their injury and its cause. The 
reasoning is therefore analogous to the discovery rule applied in the context of statutes of 
limitation. In that context, a determination of whether the facts of a particular case 
support the application of the discovery rule is a decision composed of subsidiary parts: 
first, a determination of whether, as a matter of law, the discovery rule should apply; and 
second, a close analysis of whether the particular facts of an individual case warrant the 
tolling of the statute of limitations. As such, this overarching question of whether the 
discovery rule should apply to the particular facts of a case is best described as a mixed 
question of fact and law because it is a "determination of whether a given set of facts 
comes within the reach of a given rule of law."6 State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
6
 The clear majority of courts considering this question "hold that, for the purposes of the 
discovery rule, ascertaining whether the plaintiff engaged in reasonable diligence or when 
the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury is a question for the trier of fact." 
51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 430 (collecting cases); see also Callahan v. State, 
464 N.W.2d 268, 273 (Iowa 1990); Cooper v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co.. 2002 WL 
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1994); see also Drake v. Industrial Common. 939 P.2d 177, 181 n.6 (Utah 1997) 
(adopting Pena analysis for review of administrative agency actions). 
In general, the statute of limitations begins to run "when the last event necessary 
to complete the cause of action occurs." Sew v. Security Title Co.. 902 P.2d 629, 634 
(Utah 1995). However, the discovery rule forms an exception to the general rule 
regarding the triggering of the statute of limitations, under which the limitation period 
does not begin to run "until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of 
action." Id. (citations omitted). The discovery rule applies in three situations: 
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by 
statute; (2) in situations where a plaintiff does not become 
aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's 
concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in situations 
where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, 
regardless of any showing that the defendant has prevented 
the discovery of the cause of action. 
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992). A court determining 
whether a statute of limitations is tolled by the discovery rule must perform at least two 
analytical steps. First, the court must consider whether the case falls under one of the 
three areas delineated in Warren as being suitable for the discovery rule. Second, the 
court must consider whether the facts of the particular case before it support the 
application of the discovery rule. 
The first analytical step involves questions of, for example, whether the discovery 
rule falls within one of the two Warren areas, or whether a "particular action[] or 
1980449, *23 (Md. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2002); Black Bear Lodge v. Trillium Corp., 620 
A.2d 428, 430 (N.H. 1993); Matson v. Weidenkopf, 3 P.3d 805, 811 (Wash. Ct. App. 
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omission[ is] crucial to the application of the discovery rule to particular causes of 
action." Sew v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 635 (Utah 1995). This first prong 
presents a question of law, one that is given no deference because the reviewing court is 
in as good a position as the lower court to analyze the law. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 936. 
This standard has also been applied to a discovery rule analysis where no facts were in 
dispute, as in two cases cited by the County below, Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 
1125 (Utah 1992), and Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990). In those cases, 
where there were no subsidiary issues of fact to be determined, review as a matter of law 
was proper. See Sew, 902 P.2d 634-35 (declining to rule as matter of law on discovery 
rule issue in fact of disputed issue of face and holding "that the issue of when a claimant 
discovered or should have discovered the facts, forming the basis of a cause of action is a 
question of fact, and the fact finder's conclusion cannot be overturned on appeal unless it 
is clearly erroneous"). 
Thus, in a case such as this where the facts were in dispute, a second analytical 
step is required. Once the court has concluded as a matter of law that the discovery rule 
can apply, it must also consider whether application of the rule is merited on the facts of 
the specific case before it. In doing so, the court must necessarily resolve factual issues 
about whether, for example, a defendant has concealed the existence of a cause of action. 
By its very nature, application of the discovery rule requires a determination of when a 
party discovered the facts necessary to create a cause of action. The question of when a 
party actually discovered the facts necessary to support a cause of action is "'a classic 
2000). 
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factual dispute that should be resolved by the finder of fact.'" Id. at 634 (quoting 
Andreini v. Hultgren. 860 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1993)). "Factual questions are generally 
regarded as entailing the empirical, such as things, events, actions, or conditions 
happening, existing, or taking place, as well as the subjective, such as state of mind." 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). In this case, the Council was faced with a 
determination of when the Deputies discovered their cause of action—a classic question 
of fact, being an "event[], action[], or condition[] happening, existing, or taking place." 
Id. Because the Council was sitting as fact finder, it was in an advantaged position to 
"assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, 
something an appellate court cannot hope to garner from a cold record."7 State v. Pena, 
7
 Pena illustrates why the Council's determination should be afforded considerable 
deference on review as a question of fact. That landmark standards of review case 
explained that there are 
three reasons that are useful in discerning when some degree 
of discretion ought to be left to a trial court: (i) when the 
facts to which the legal rule is to be applied are so complex 
and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance 
of all these facts can be spelled out; (ii) when the situation to 
which the legal principle is to be applied is sufficiently new to 
the courts that appellate judges are unable to anticipate and 
articulate definitively what factors should be outcome 
determinative; and (iii) when the trial judge has observed 
'facts,' such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, 
relevant to the application of the law that cannot be 
adequately reflected in the record available to the appellate 
court. 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-39. Two of these factors apply to the present case, lending further 
support to a grant of considerable deference to the Council's timeliness determination. 
First, the facts supporting the application of the discovery rule necessarily vary from case 
to case, so that no general rule can be articulated to govern every situation. In each case, 
then, the finder of fact must determine anew whether facts exist to support application of 
222027 8 
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that "the 
issue of when a claimant discovered or should have discovered the facts forming the basis 
of a cause of action is a question of fact, and the fact finder's conclusion cannot be 
overturned on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous." Sew, 902 P.2d 634. 
In essence, the Deputies' claim that their cause of action was concealed amounts 
to "a claim of equitable estoppel, whereby a defendant who causes a delay in the bringing 
of a cause of action is estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense to 
the action."8 Warren, 838 P.2d at 1129. This court has previously held that 
[t]he application of facts to the legal standard of equitable 
estoppel is a mixed question of fact and law. Similar to the 
doctrine of waiver, the determination of equitable estoppel is 
"a highly fact-dependent question, one that we cannot 
profitably review de novo in every case because we cannot 
hope to work out a coherent statement of the law through a 
course of such decisions." 
Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Pena, 
869 P.2d at 938). Thus, the court grants "broadened discretion" to the finder of fact 
regarding a claim of equitable estoppel. See id. 
In this case, the Council determined, on three separate occasions, after hearing 
witness testimony and considering other evidence, that the three-month rule began to run 
the rule. Second, only the Council saw the witnesses' testimony, took evidence, and was 
privileged to participate in the case, so to speak, in the trenches. 
The County argued below that the Deputies could not assert that the discovery rule had 
tolled the three-month rule because equitable estoppel cannot be asserted against a 
governmental entity. (R. 432-33) As the County noted, in Weese v. Davis Co. Comm'n, 
834 P.2d 1 (Utah 1992), the Supreme Court stated that "Utah recognizes the general rule 
that estoppel may not be asserted against a governmental entity." Id. at 4-5. However, 
this general rule does not apply when the facts show "some compelling cause, such as 
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in December 1996, when the Deputies met with Sheriff Bateman and first discovered the 
facts that formed their cause of action. This determination, which is in essence a 
determination that the three-month rule was tolled by the discovery rule, is a question of 
fact that should be afforded considerable discretion, reversed only if it is so lacking in 
record support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. As discussed below, the 
record amply supports the Council's finding that the Deputies' grievance was timely 
filed. 
2. The Council's timeliness determination was supported by the record 
and thus should be upheld. 
The Council's finding that the triggering event for the Deputies' grievance did not 
occur until December 1996 was well supported in the record and thus should not be 
disturbed on review. The Deputies met with Sheriff Bateman on December 17, 1996, 
eight days after, and in direct response to, Sergeant Morgan's disclosure of illegal testing 
activities. Sheriff Bateman's December 30, 1996, response disclosed, for the very first 
time, the erroneous basis upon which the Deputies had been denied the promotion in 
1991 - that "Shift Supervisor was never a ranked position" in the Department, an 
assertion the Sheriff later abandoned in sworn testimony before the Council. This 
disclosure also revealed, for the very first time, that the Sheriff had acted on this false 
premise in every promotional "testing" process utilized by the Department since the 
elimination of the Shift Supervisor rank in 1991. The Sheriff also acknowledged, for the 
first time, that there had been "irregularities" in the Department's promotional processes, 
dishonesty, fraud, or collusion." Id. at 5. Thus, the general rule expressed in Weese does 
not apply to bar the Deputies' claims. 
processes in which the Deputies had participated but were unsuccessful. The Council 
ultimately characterized those "irregularities" as "inconsistent, biased, and capricious" 
testing. In other words, the Deputies did not know, and had no way of knowing, the 
factual basis for the Department's failure to promote them until December 1996. 
In addition, the record before the Council clearly establishes that Deputies were 
repeatedly assured by Department management that they would be treated fairly as a 
result of the "reclassification" of their ranked positions and the Sheriff personally assured 
them that he would "make things right." The Deputies were urged by the Department to 
resolve their issues internally, and there was considerable institutional pressure for them 
to do so. One desiring promotion and success within the Department is unlikely to find it 
if he or she is perceived as unwilling to work within the system. The Deputies were more 
than willing, and made every effort to do so. At the Department's urging, the Deputies 
continued to apply for promotions within the Department. However, unbeknownst to the 
Deputies until December 1996, the promotion and eligibility requirements fluctuated 
widely and were often disregarded by Department management. 
The Council correctly held that it was not until these facts were revealed in 
December 1996 that the Deputies were on notice of their claim and that the three-month 
rule began to run. The Deputies therefore had three months from the revelation of these 
facts within which to pursue their grievance, and it is undisputed that they timely did so. 
Alternatively, the Department's repeated false assurances to the Deputies, and its 
concealment of the promotion irregularities, justify any delay in proceeding with the 
grievance. As a matter of equity, the County should not now be allowed to benefit from 
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fraudulent affirmative measures that were taken to prevent or delay the Deputies from 
pursuing legal recourse. The Department's fraudulent behavior toward the deputies in 
effect equitably tolled the Deputies claim until the December 1996. 
Any benefit of a doubt in this regard must be resolved in favor of upholding the 
Council's decision, and this Court should give the proper deference to the Council's 
decision. The record shows that the Deputies relied on the representations made by the 
Department that they would be made Sergeants, and the record supports the Council's 
determination that it was not until December 1996 that the Deputies discovered that these 
representations had been false and that the Department had engaged in unlawful 
employment practices in promoting others before the Deputies. Given the rosy promises 
that were being made, apparently with the intent of dissuading the Deputies from 
proceeding with a grievance, and the promotion irregularities that were hidden from the 
Deputies, the County should not be heard to complain about timeliness. 
3. Even if reviewed as a question of law, the Council's timeliness 
determination should be upheld because it was not a gross and flagrant 
abuse of discretion. 
As discussed above, the Council's determination that the Deputies timely filed 
should be reviewed for clear error, "giving deference to the initial decision maker on 
questions of fact because it stands in a superior position from which to evaluate and 
weigh the evidence and assess the credibility and accuracy of witnesses' recollections." 
Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). However, even if this 
Court reviews the Council's determination as a matter of law, it should nonetheless be 
afforded an extra measure of discretion and reversed only if the ruling was a gross and 
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flagrant abuse of discretion. This is so for two reasons: first, because of the procedural 
posture in which this case arose, namely, an appeal of a Rule 65B petition for 
extraordinary writ; and second, because the Council is uniquely well-suited to resolve 
disputed issues of fact regarding its three-month rule and the interaction of that rule's the 
procedural requirements with the overriding goal of encouraging the application of merit 
principles in public employment. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-3 (defining merit 
principles); id §17-33-4 (stating Council must be comprised of "persons in sympathy 
with the application of merit principles to public employment"). 
On review of a petition brought under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, "[w]here the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the court's review 
shall not extend further than to determine whether the [tribunal] has regularly pursued its 
authority." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(4). It is undisputed that the proceedings before the 
Council were judicial in nature. (R. 476) Both sides were represented by legal counsel, 
and were given the opportunity to put on evidence, call witnesses, and cross-examine 
opposing witnesses. See, e.g., Atiya v. Salt Lake County, 988 F.2d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir. 
1993) (stating that proceedings before Salt Lake County Career Service Council were 
judicial in nature). Thus, this Court's review should "not extend further than to 
determine whether [the Council] has regularly pursued its authority." Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B(d)(4); see also State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) allows a reviewing court "to direct the particular exercise of 
[an inferior tribunal's] judgment to correct [that tribunal's] abuse of discretion." Stirba 
972 P.2d at 922; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(A) (authorizing relief "where an 
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inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded 
its jurisdiction or abused its discretion"). Although Rule 65B uses the familiar term 
"abuse of discretion," a term that is used even in run-of-the-mill standard of review 
discussions, as applied by our appellate courts "'abuse of discretion' for Rule 
65B(d)(2)(A) writs must be much more blatant than the garden variety 'abuse of 
discretion' featured in routine appellate review." Stirba, 972 P.2d at 922. Moreover, this 
highly deferential standard of review is not limited to review of the lower tribunal's 
findings of fact, or even its resolution of mixed questions of fact and law. Rather, the 
more deferential standard is also applied to the lower tribunal's resolution of issues of 
law. As this court noted in Stirba, "a simple mistake of law does not qualify as the kind 
of gross and flagrant abuse of discretion necessary for a Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ to issue." 
Id. at 923. In sum, a lower tribunal's exercise of discretion should only be overturned via 
a Rule 65B writ "in the face of a particularly egregious and momentous legal error." Id. 
Even assuming for argument's sake that the Council's timeliness determination 
was erroneous, any such error cannot rightly be considered a gross and flagrant abuse of 
discretion. The Council considered the issue of timeliness on several occasions, hearing 
testimony and taking evidence, and in each instance reaffirmed its initial determination 
that the three-month rule should begin to run in December 1996, when the Deputies 
learned the facts necessary to create their cause of action. Not only did the Council 
reaffirm its decision three times, but the trial court also affirmed the legitimacy of the 
Council's decision and effectively resisted the reconstituted Council's attempt to vacate 
the first decision. 
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The second reason the Council's decision should be allowed to stand, even if it is 
reviewed as a question of law, is that the Council is uniquely suited to consider the 
application of its three-month rule and whether, in any given case, such procedural 
considerations should trump the Council's overarching goal of fostering the application 
of merit principles to public employment. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-3 (defining merit 
principles); id. §17-33-4 (stating Council must be comprised of "persons in sympathy 
with the application of merit principles to public employment"). 
The Council, which is statutorily charged with the task of ensuring that merit 
principles are followed in career service employment, should have the discretion to 
decide whether a particularly egregious case, like this one, warrants unique treatment. 
The Council, after all, is interpreting its own rules and should have some flexibility in 
doing so. In this case, for example, the Council was so concerned with what it heard that 
it felt compelled to castigate the Department for its conduct over the years, and request 
that it correct the errors of its ways. Perhaps even more important, if this Court does not 
afford the Council a measure of discretion in determining what its own rules mean, this 
Court will, in the future, be obligated to review internal personnel rules as a matter of 
law. We respectfully submit that the Council is in a much better position to determine 
and apply its own rules, consistent with its statutory obligation to respect and uphold 
merit principles. 
CONCLUSION 
The Council's determination that the Deputies' grievance was timely filed, and 
that the three-month rule began to run in December 1996 when the Deputies learned the 
222027.8 
Q1 
facts necessary to create their cause of action, should have been reviewed by the trial 
court as a mixed question of fact and law, with considerable deference afforded the 
Council's subsidiary findings of fact. Because the trial court improperly reviewed the 
Council's determination for correctness, affording no deference to the Council's superior 
ability to implement personnel rules and evaluate the credibility of the evidence presented 
to it on three separate occasions, this Court should reverse the trial court's order granting 
the County's Petition for Extraordinary Writ. Such a reversal would, in effect, reinstate 
the Council's determination that the Deputies filed timely. 
This result would best serve the interests of justice and of furthering the merit-
based system of public employment at issue in this case. Both the Council and the trial 
court found that the County's promotion practices were riddled with irregularities, even 
arbitrary and capricious, and the County has uot appealed that determination. The 
Council, which is statutorily mandated to be "in sympathy" with merit principles, 
concluded that the Deputies should be promoted to Sergeant and given back pay. If there 
is any doubt regarding the timeliness of the Deputies' filing, equity and the interests of 
justice demand that the doubt be resolved in favor of the Deputies' case being resolved 
on the merits, rather than by a procedural ruling based on an erroneous application of the 
law. 
ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellants' 
appendix of important documents is bound as part of this brief. 
222027 8 
DATED this 23rd day of September, 2002. 
SNELL & WILMER, LLP 
Todd M. Shaughnessy 
Tawni J. Sherman 
Attorneys for Appellants George 
Alexanderson and Charles Martin 
222027 8 
n^ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that the foregoing APPEAL BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
GEORGE ALEXANDERSON AND CHARLES MARTIN was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this 23rd day of September, 2002, to the following: 
M. Cort Griffin 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2400 
Provo,Utah 84606 
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ADDENDUM 
June 30, 1997 
Deputy George S. A l e x a n d e r s 
P.O. Box 607 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Deputy Charles H. Martin 
487 N. 1030 E. 
Orem, UT 84<SC3 
Dear Deputies Martin and AJexanderson, 
^ 
,V& 
Thank you for your patience in awaiting a reply regarding your grievance hearing. As a 
Career Service Council we felt like we needed to take the time to review your case carefully. The 
following is an outline of your statement of relief and our recommendation resulting from the hearing. 
L) Retroactive reinstatement to the rank of Sergeant (formerly named Shift 
Supervisor), non-probationary and competent level 
The council does not recommend that you be reinstated to the rank of Sergeant because 
you never achieved that rank. However, we do recommend that you both be promoted to the 
Sergeants rank, elective immediately. 
Appropriate Reparations 
*) Back Pay at Sergeants level of compensarion 
b) Attorneys Fees and Costs 
Sousrss^r^^r^r ^ ^ - s ^ w 
of Sergean:. * < * e r P O S a b l = r c i a t K l b c l c S u commensurate with the rant 
our scope 
3) 
~l^£Uttah[S t 0 ^ ^ " * * ° n *« « ° ™ * * « « « * « « , because it is outade 
, Implementation of Standardized and Uootased Testing Procedures 
It appears that promotions have been based on arfchrarv rr,*.„%, x-procedures aoDoir tnccnastr-t h , « ^ , T ^rtrary criteria. The current testing 
encioyees were p r o n ^ S T L , « d capnexou* Evidence supported the Set that some 
. /ees ere promoted to the Sergeant's rank that did not meet me q u a l i f i e r outlined in 
the various policies. 
The council recommends that the county implement standardized and unbiased testing 
procedures. All policies regarding promotional testing should be updated, consistent with each 
other, clearly communicated to all applicable employees, and carefully followed. 
4) Written Admission and Apology, to be placed in Deputies personnel files, that 
failure to give Deputies earned rank of Sergeant was an oversight 
The council believes a written admissions and apology is not necessary. The above 
outlined recommendations should be adequate to substantiate and resolve your concerns. 
In addition to the above statement of relief the council would also like to address the 
concern brought up by you regarding your statement that you were not promoted because you arc 
not members of the Mormon faith. The council feels there was insufficient evidence to support 
this. 
The council wouid also like to reconfirm that we did not feel like this hearing should be 
bzixzd because af che timefiness of filing. We felt like yaur discussion with SherifFBateman in 
December, 1996 was the date that should drive the time for filing. You filed within 90 days of that 
date, therefore, wc proceeded with the hearing. 
/ 
Again, thank you for your patience in bringing this issue to resolution, 
Deborah L. Gatcicy, Utah County Career Service Council Date 
yyb A 
Ryp: R_ Bcuhring, Utah Countv^areer Service Council Date 
Kay Bryscn - Utah County Attorney 
personnel file 
David L. Blackner, Utah State Bar No. 5376 
THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID L. BLACKNER 
Attorney for Respondents 
Kearns Building Mezzanine 
134 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)521-3480 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON and 
CHARLES H. MARTIN, 
Respondents. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND REMANDING MATTER 
TO UTAH COUNTY CAREER SERVICE 
COUNCIL 
Case No.: 970400590 
Judge: The Honorable Howard H. Maetani 
Respondents Alexanderson and Martin's motion to dismiss petitioner Utah 
County's petition for extraordinary relief came on for hearing before the Court on 
October 1, 1997 at 8:30 a.m., the Honorable Howard H. Maetani presiding. Respondents 
were represented in person at die hearing by theii counsel, David L. Blackner. Petitioner 
was represented in person at the hearing by its counsel, M. Cort Griffin. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings filed by the parties, and having heard 
arguments on the matter, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
a. That respondents' motion to dismiss the petition is hereby denied. 
b. That this matter be remanded to the Utah County Career Service Council (the 
"Council") for the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law in connection with its 
decision of June 30, 1997, but that this Court will retain jurisdiction over this matter 
pending the entry of such findings of fact and conclusions of law by the Council. 
c. That in connection with the entry of such findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, the Council may, among other things, as it, in its discretion, may elect: 
i. Request that one, both, or neither of the parties prepare proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law for adoption by the 
Council; 
ii. Hear any objections to such proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as it may choose to hear and consider; 
iii. Review all or such portions of the record as it may deem necessary 
or desirable; 
iv. Take such further testimony, or accept such further evidence, as it 
may deem necessary or desirable; 
v. Make such changes, additions, or modifications to its decision as it 
may deem necessary or desirable; and 
vi. Do such other things, and take such further actions, as it may deem 
necessary or desirable to clarify or enhance the record of the 
proceedings for eventual review by this Court. 
d. That petitioner Utah County arrange for, and bear the cost of, the preparation 
of a hearing transcript by a certified court reporter and that such transcript be provided to 
the Council in connection with the preparation of such findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. 
e. That upon the entry of such findings of fact and conclusions of law by the 
Council, and the delivery of the record to the Court, this Court will then perform its 
review thereof in accordance with applicable law and as requested by Utah County in its 
petition for extraordinary relief. 
DATED this ^ 7 day of October, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
Career Service Council 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2200 
Provo,UT 84606 
November 22, 1999 
Deputy George S. Alexanderson 
P.O. Box 706 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Charles H. Martin 
487 North 1080 East 
Orem,UT 84057 
Utah County Attorney's Office 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100 
Provo,UT 84606 
Stephen W. Cook 
323 South 600 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
RE: Fourth Judicial District Court / Case #: 970400590 
toward 
To the above parties: 
The Career Service Council has reviewed the documents on file in this informally administered 
case. None of the current members of the council were involved in the hearings or the decision 
rendered in this matter. After review, the council determines the previous decision dated June 
30, 1997, is a "final decision" in this matter as contemplated by UCA 63-46b-5(i). 
All proceedings in this matter were conducted informally according to the history and practice of 
the Career Service Council. The informal record is, in significant parts, unintelligible and 
impossible to review. 
The council determines that the appeal for judicial review of this informal proceeding be 
pursuant to UCA 63-46b-15. 
0 i \ 
' 4vj 
1 
Sincerely, 
(l(mt /(• ly-gy 
Mark F. Robinson - Career Service Council Date 
2 
jurth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
H/iofo 1M\
 DfipiJty 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, : 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Petitioner, : AND SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
vs. 
GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON and Case No. 970400590 
CHARLES H. MARTIN, 
Judge Howard H. Maetani 
Respondents. 
The above-entitled matter came regularly before the Court, the Honorable 
Fred D. Howard, presiding, on March 3, 2000, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. for pre-
trial conference. The Petitioner was represented by M. Cort Griffin. The 
Respondents were present and were represented by Stephen W. Cook. After 
having reviewed the file, heard the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised 
in the premises, the Court finds and concludes that the following Order To Show 
Cause should be directed at the Utah Career Service Council. 
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The members of the Utah Career Service Council, viz., Sherlynn 
Fenstermaker, Lloyd Evans and Mark F. Robinson, are hereby ordered to appear 
before the above court on May 1, 2000, at the hour of 10:30 a.m. and show 
cause, if any they have, or the Utah Career Service Council has, why the Court 
should not proceed and enter an appropriate order relative to the pending case 
and/or whether the Utah County Career Service Counsel has satisfied the 1997 
Remand Order 
2. The Court shall also conduct a scheduling conference with the 
parties on May 1, 2000, at the hour of 10 30 a.m. 
DATED this </^day ofMarch, 2000. 
BY THE COURT , K t J £ j ^
 A 
Approved as to form-
M CORT GRIFF I^N/y 
Utah County Attorneyig/Office 
STEPHEN W COOK 
Attorney for Respondents 
UTAH COUNTY CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL 
CHARLES MARTIN : RULING 
GEORGE ALEXANDERSON 
Appellant, 
vs. 
PERS ONNEL DEPARTMENT : 
UTAH COUNTY GOVERNMENT 
Employer 
The previous Utah County Career Service Council, (none of whom are still on the 
Council) heard the case and entered a decision. Utah County filed a petition for extraordinary 
relief from that decision. The Court, in or about October 27, 1997 entered an Order of Remand 
to the Council. The Council reviewed the record and filed a response. The Court ruled the 
Councils response inadequate and directed, pursuant to an Order to Show Cause, a satisfactory 
response to the Remand Order. 
The existing Council has spent many hours with this case, reviewing written record and 
attempting to understand the audio tape record, which in many parts is "inaudible". After 
completing its review, this Council is unanimous in its disagreement with the prior Council's 
decision. 
The Order of Remand dated October 27, 1997, permits and directs this Council, in its 
discretion, to: 
iii. Review all or such portions of the record as it may deem necessary or desirable; 
v. Make such changes, additions, or modifications to its decision as it may deem 
necessary or desirable; and 
vi. Do such other things, and take such further actions, as it may deem necessary or 
desirable to clarify or enhance the record of the proceeding for eventual review by 
this Court. 
Upon completion of the foregoing, this Court would then perform its review in 
accordance with applicable law as requested by Utah County in its petition for extraordinary 
relief. 
As directed, the present Council now makes and enters its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusion of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. A Classification Study occurred and was completed on July 15, 1991, where the 
title of Shift Supervisor was eliminated. In response to this change Sergeant 
2 
positions were created at the jail. 
2. When the title of shift supervisor was eliminated, those who had such jobs 
continued working as Correction Specialists with no change in grade or salary. 
3. Martin and Alexanderson who had been Shift Supervisors applied to become 
Sergeants in 1991 and were not promoted. 
4. Deputy Martin wrote a letter in April 1992, explaining how he felt about the 
process of choosing Sergeants. No formal grievance was filed at that time. 
5. Application were taken for various Sergeant positions between 1991 and 1996. 
Martin and/or Alexanderson applied for some, but not all of those positions. They 
were not promoted. No grievance was filed for any of those hiring decisions. 
6. A meeting was held on December 17, 1996, at which Martin and Alexanderson 
explained to Sheriff Bateman their frustration with hiring decisions made between 
1991 and 1996. Bateman prepared a memorandum of that meeting dated 
December 30, 1996, addressing their concerns. 
7. Grievance dated January 10, 1997, was filed after reviewing Sheriff Bateman7 s 
memo dated December 30, 1996, by Martin and Alexanderson. 
3 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The grievance of George Alexanderson and Charles Martin dated January 10, 1997 was 
not timely and is dismissed. Any prior contrary finding or conclusion of the previous Council is 
vacated. 
Respectfully, 
(Tsherlynnl^n^ County Career Service Council Chair Date 
4-2-1-zrtb 
*-y-7?-
loyd Evans - Utah County Career Service Council 
Mark JR-Robinson - Utah County Career Service Council 
»$/-<? 7- ^ Z 7 
Date 
Date 
4 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling with postage 
prepaid theron this "7^ day of H-pH I , "ZOCO , to the following: 
Charles Martin 
487 North 1080 East 
Orem, UT 84057 
George Alexanderson 
P.O. Box 706 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Stephen W. Cook 
323 South 600 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Utah County Attorney's Office 
100 East Center 
Provo, UT 84606 
Utah County Sheriff 
3075 North Main 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
Sarah Kuiz 
Career Service Council Secretary 
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4TH DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DEPT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GEORGE S ALEXANDERSON Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Case No: 970400590 AA 
Judge: FRED D. HOWARD 
Date: September 12, 2000 
Clerk: wendyw 
PRESENT 
Defendant(s): GEORGE S ALEXANDERSON 
CHARLES H MARTIN 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): M CORT GRIFFIN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STEPHEN W. COOK 
Video 
Tape Number: 0038 Tape Count: 8:49 
HEARING 
TAPE: 0038 COUNT: 8:49 
Mr Cook addresses the Court. Mr Griffin responds. Mr Cook 
responds. Counsel submits for decision.The Court finds that the 
first decision was final, District Court retained jurisdiction and 
findings must be consistent with first decision of the board. 
Mr Griffin requests opportunity to address the limitation of 
actions. Mr Griffin is given 90 days to brief the case and Mr Cook 
30 days to respond. Mr Cook is to prepare the order. 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, 
ORDER SUSTAINING 
Petitioner, OBJECTIONS 
vs. : 
GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON and Case No. 970400590 
CHARLES H. MARTIN, : 
Respondents. : 
The Respondents' Objection To April 27, 2000, Ruling Of Career 
Service Council came regularly before the Court, the Honorable Fred D. 
Howard, Fourth Judicial District Court Judge, presiding on September 12, 
2000. The Petitioner was represented by its counsel, M Cort Griffin. The 
Respondents were present and were represented by their counsel, Stephen 
W. Cook. After having reviewed the file including the memoranda of the 
parties, after having heard the oral arguments of the parties, ana after having 
been fully informed in the premises, the Court finds and concludes that the 
Utah County Career Service Council (herein "Council") failed to follow the 
Court's Order dated October 27, 1997, and exceeded the Council's 
jurisdiction by entering it's April 27, 2000 Ruling, that the Court by it's 
October 27, 1997 Order had retained jurisdiction oyer the matter and the 
purpose of the Court's Order was for the entry of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law consistent with the Council's Ruling of June 30, 1997, that 
the Council's April 27, 2000 Ruling was inconsistent with it's June 30, 1997 
Ruling, that the Court should disregard the Council's April 27, 2000 Ruling, 
that the Court should proceed and decide the issues raised by the 
Petitioner's Petition For Extraordinary Relief in light of the Council's actions 
without the benefit of findings of fact and conclusions of law, and that the 
Respondents' objections to the April 27, 2000 Ruling of the Utah County 
Career Service Council should be sustained. 
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Respondent's Objections to the Council's April 27, 2000 
Ruling is sustained and the Court will disregard such ruling as being outside 
the jurisdiction of the Council and in disregard of the Court's Order dated 
October 27, 1997. 
2. The Court will proceed to hear the merits of the Petitioner's 
Petition For Extraordinary Relief in the absence of formal findings of fact and 
conclusions of law based upon the transcript, exhibits, and record of the 
proceedings. 
3. The Petitioner shall file any appropriate motion and 
corresponding memoranda in support of the merits of the Petitioner's Petition 
For Extraordinary Relief on or before January 10, 2001. The Respondents 
Order **** oaee 2 
shall have until February 15, 2001, in which to file a response. The Petitioner 
shall then have twenty days in which to file a reply if desired. 
DATED this Z 2 ^ a y of / % ^ W i 2000. 
n r r l f l t - * * * * . ™ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
STEPHEN W. COOK, being duly sworn, says: 
That he is the attorney for herein; and that he served the attached 
ORDER SUSTAINING OBJECTIONS upon: 
M. Cort Griffin 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2400 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Utah County Career Service Counsel 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2200 
Provo, Utah 84606 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and depositing the 
same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereonjn the United States 
mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 6. day oLS%fefnb%r, 2000. 
JLcJbd^ 
STEPHEN W. COOK 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of September, 
2000. 
""" Notary PtibHc i 
ELIZABETH RSRIE , 
323 South 600 East, #200 8 
Salt Lake CHy, Utati 84102 -
My Commission Eapfres | 
January 29,2003 
State of Utah J 
osaaai scram masn masot ascwi IBBOB arudS 
C\rr\&r * * * * m o p J. 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON, 
CHARLES H. MARTIN, 
Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case # 970400590 AA 
Hon. Fred D. Howard 
The above-entitled matter came before the court on the Petitioner's Motion for Extraordinary 
Relief The court having reviewed the Petition, and the Respondent's Obj ection thereto; and the court 
having considered the relevant documents and the parties' respective arguments makes the following 
decision. 
ANALYSIS AND RULING 
I. Standard of Review 
Under Utah R.Civ.P. 65B(d)(2)(A), this court may grant appropriate relief "where an inferior 
court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or 
abused its discretion." This court acts as an appellate court and will accord the Career Services 
Council (hereafter, the Council) broad deference in its findings of fact, but will review the Council's 
conclusions of law for correctness. 
1 
II. Merit Principles 
In its June 30, 1997, letter of decision to Deputies Martin and Alexanderson, the Council 
specifically found that "promotions were based on arbitrary criteria. The current testing procedures 
appear inconsistent, biased and capricious. Evidence supported the fact that some employees were 
promoted to the Sergeant's rank that did not meet the qualifications outlined in the various policies." 
The Council did not make specific citations to the record to support its findings. 
The record and pleadings in this case are voluminous and this court will not attempt to re-
iterate point by point the evidence in support and contrary to the Council's findings. After fully 
reviewing the transcript of the Council hearings, and the pleadings filed by both parties, this court 
finds sufficient evidence to uphold the Council's finding that the testing procedures were at best 
inconsistent, and very likely involved subjective criteria to the point of being arbitrary and violative 
of merit principles. 
Of specific concern to the court is the use of the Jail Policies and Procedures Manual (JPPM) 
by the County. The County argues that the JPPM is advisory and not binding between the County and 
its employees. While such an argument may attempt to place the County on firm legal ground, it 
cannot do so where the JPPM was used as a sword against employees and a shield to protect the 
County from liability. In this matter, officer employees were expected to "have read and expressed 
their clear understanding of the material to the satisfaction of the Jail Training Officer," even though 
it had no legal effect whatsoever. The court is persuaded that the manner in which the JPPM was 
2 
utilized communicated to officer employees that it could be relied upon despite the disclaimer. It is 
the County's position that while the JPPM is non-binding and can be changed at any time, an 
employee is expected to know and understand all of this non-binding material. Such an approach is 
inherently unfair as illustrated with the following examples. 
Section 150.0 states that "the retention and promotion of all jail staff members will be based 
on the demonstration of merit, specified qualifications, and competitive examinations." To the 
deputies' assertion that this provision was violated, the County responds that even if it was, it does 
not matter because it was not binding in any case. Assuming the County is correct, however, this 
circumstance leaves the deputy applicant unable to assess what he or she nees to do to qualify for 
promotion. It is reasonable for the deputy to believe that the policies described in the JPPM will be 
followed; and if are not binding, the county has an obligation to give adequate advance notice to 
employees of where they intend to vary from the JPPM directions. 
Another example is § 150.2(1) which states that "all staff members who desire promotion will 
be subject to (a) written examination, (b) oral interviews and (c) review evaluations and length of 
service." The County argues that the phrase "subject to" means that while the County may use these 
criteria in the promotion process it is not required to because it is given discretion and flexibility. 
Further, it contends that even if it does mean they must consider such criteria, no violation of merit 
principles occurred because this provision is not binding. However, the court is unpersuaded by such 
argument because again, a deputy is unable to assess what criteria will be utilized in the promotion 
3 
4 A** . 
process notwithstanding published JPPM criteria. Numerous other illustrations of conflict and 
contradiction with the use of the JPPM and the promotion process are contained in the parties' 
pleadings. 
In addition to the preceding, the court also notes the argument of the Petitioner that ultimately 
it is unimportant whether the promotion process differs from one hiring to the next so long as all of 
the individual applicants are equally treated within the same promotion process. The court strongly 
disagrees with this argument. Such an argument ignores the possibility that the playing field can be 
slanted before the process even begins. With the promotion requirements in a constant state of flux, 
applicants are unable to reasonably and accurately assess the testing procedures and the subjective 
weight given to each of the promotion criteria from one hiring to the next. The applicants are unable 
to reasonably forecast the promotion qualifications and make advance preparations for his or her 
application. Further, the process is subject to manipulation to favor or prevent qualified individuals 
from acquiring promotions for reasons other than merit principles. 
Taken together, this court is persuaded that there is sufficient evidence to support 
Respondents' claim that the County deviated from a regular process of promotion based on merit 
principles. Therefore, the finding of the Council on this issue will not be overturned. 
III. Statute of Limitations 
The court next examines the question of whether as a matter of law, Respondents' claims are 
barred by the statute of limitations. In its letter decision the Council stated that "we did not feel like 
4 
this hearing should be barred because of the issue of timeliness. We felt like your discussion with 
Sheriff Bateman in December 1996 was the date that should drive the time for filing. You filed within 
90 days of that date, therefore, we proceeded with the hearing." This decision is a conclusion of law 
that must be reviewed for correctness. 
By their own claim, Respondents expected that all shift supervisors would be promoted to 
Sargent after the 1991 salary survey. Neither Respondent was promoted, a fact known by each of 
them in 1991. The cause of action of each Respondent arose at that time, the time of their non-
promotion. 
Section VILE. 1 of the Utah County Office of Personnel Management Rules and Regulations 
states: 
Any career service employee who has completed a Schedule B probationary period 
or a promotional trial period having a grievance over merit principles may appeal to 
the Career Service Council. The employee must file a written notice with the 
personnel director within three months of the date of the occurrence. 
Utah case law holds that "Generally, a cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of limitations 
begin to run when the last event that will complete the cause of action occurs, and simple ignorance 
of or obliviousness to the existence of a cause of action will not prevent the running of the statute of 
limitations." Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds, Inc. 920 P.2d 575, 578 (Utah App. 1996). In this 
matter, the record is clear that the statute of limitations period began when Respondents were passed 
over for promotion in 1991. By express ordinance rule, they were to file their grievance complaint 
within three months of such occurrence. They failed to bring their claim within the three months of 
5 
the alleged grievance. 
After careful review of the parties' authorities and argument on this subject, the court is 
persuaded that the Council erroneously relied on the December 1996 meeting with Sheriff Bat eman 
as the "occurrence" that commenced the statute of limitations period. The court is unpersuaded by 
the circumstances of this case that the conversation with Sheriff Bateman renewed the limitations 
time period. Respondents' request that past grievances be "looked into" cannot be considered an 
"occurrence" within the meaning of the statute of limitations. Otherwise, as correctly noted by 
Petitioner, anytime an aggrieved party requested reconsideration, the limitations time period would 
begin to run anew thus defeating public policies of the statute of limitations entirely. 
Among other things, the statute of limitations prevents the "revival of claims that have been 
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared." Sew v. Security Title, 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995). A review of the hearing 
transcript persuasively reveals that such described dangers are present in this case - documents have 
been destroyed, witnesses are unable to remember important events, and other important witnesses 
cannot be located. 
There is no factual dispute that Respondents failed to properly raise their claim within three 
months of the alleged grievance. The record is also void of facts that would allow this court to apply 
the discovery, fraudulent concealment or the exceptional circumstances exceptions. For these reasons, 
and those stated in Petitioner's memoranda, the statute of limitations has long passed and 
6 
Respondents' claims are barred as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, the Petition for Extraordinary Relief is granted. 
While there is merit to Respondents' claims that the County's promotion process is inconsistent, 
arbitrary and violative of merit principles, Respondents' claims are barred as a matter of law by the 
Statute of Limitations. 
The decision of the Career Services Council is respectfully reversed and Respondents' claims 
dismissed. Counsel for Petitioner is to prepare an Order consistent with this ruling and submit it to 
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to final submission to the Court for signature. 
7 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
~> "7 ~frn 
I certify that tme copies of the foregoing order were mailed, postage prepaid, on the * I day 
of September 2001 to the following at the addresses indicated, to wit: 
Stephen W. Cook 
323 South 600 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
M. Court Griffin 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2400 
Provo, UT 84606 
n 
Deputy Clerk 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
__\hJo'2L VW1 Deputy 
M. CORT GRIFFIN (4583) 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
KAY BRYSON (0473) 
Utah County Attorney 
Attorneys for Respondent 
100 East Center, Suite 2400 
Provo, UT 84606 
Telephone: (801)370-8001 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, : 
Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 
FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
vs. : 
: Case No. 970400590 
GEORGE S. ALEXANDERSON, : Honorable Fred D. Howard 
CHARLES H. MARTIN, 
Respondents. : 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing as regularly scheduled on the 27th day of July, 
2001 at 1:30 p.m. before the Honorable Fred D. Howard. Petitioner, Utah County, was represented 
by its attorney of record, M Cort Griffin, and Sheriff David Bateman was present on behalf of 
Petitioner. Respondents were present and represented by their attorney of record, Stephen W. Cook. 
The Court, having heard the arguments of the parties and having taken this matter under advisement, 
and having considered the relevant pleadings, memoranda of the parties and the record, and being 
fully advised in the premises HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
That the Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the above entitled matter is hereby granted. The 
decision of the' Utah County Career Service Council in this matter is respectfully reversed and 
Respondents' claims are hereby dismissed for Respondents failure to timely file their grievances 
before the Utah County Career Service Council. 
DATED this pA day of _ 
BY THE 
•<£ffiK£> 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that 1 mailed a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief to the below named party at the address set forth below, this Icj day of 
December, 2001. 
Stephen W. Cook 
323 South 600 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
^kfiana Q/]A-
2 
